

# A Comparison of Divided Nations: Germany, Korea, and China

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Before 1990, the world had three divided nations: Germany, Korea, and China. While Germany was unified in that year, for Korea and China, unification seems to be a distant prospect still.

Prior to unification, both East and West Germany were pragmatical enough to accept coexistence in the international areas, and the policies of North and South Korea have tended to be realistic. In the Chinese case, the PRC has made every effort to limit the diplomatic scope available to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, showing that it is unwilling to face up to the political reality that China is a divided country.<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to examine the assumption that the two Germanies and two Koreas have been more pragmatical in their dealings with each other than the two Chinese political entities. If this assumption is supported, it will be regarded as an explanatory conclusion which is always a fact. The second conclusion of this study is very clear, i.e., Germany was reunified in 1990 while Korea and China are not.

The explanatory premises of these two conclusions will be carefully examined by the use of John Stuart Mill's Method of Difference. According to Mill, two or more than two cases might be characterized by overall similarities but end up with different outcomes. The differences which they share could be the causal variables of the different phenomena to be explained (i.e., the different outcomes). Both the different causal variables and the different results are therefore combined as crucial difference (see table 1). This Method of Difference may be used to find the possible causes (i.e., premises) of the previous two conclusions. The findings of the study might tell us under what conditions the separated parts of a divided nation may choose pragmatic policies toward each other and under what conditions a divided nation may be reunified peacefully.

Because Germany was reunified in 1990, the observed period of the study will be 1987-90 with emphasis on the period of 1989-90. The

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**Table 1. The Method of Difference**

Positive case (s)	Negative case (s)	
a	a	} overall similarities
b	b	
c	c	
x	not x	
y	not y	} crucial difference

Key:

x = causal variable

y = phenomenon to be explained

Sources: Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers. "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 22 (April 1980), p. 184.

observed period will not extend beyond 1990 since changing international relations might bias the linkage between causal variables and the phenomenon to be explained. Only on very rare occasions will I take advantage of documents issued in 1991 to illustrate situations which were well developed in 1990.

### The Overall Similarities Among the Three Cases

The three divided nations are similar to each other in many respects. First, the non-communist parts of the countries were all richer than their communist counterparts during the period in question.

For example, in 1988, West Germany had a per capita GNP of US\$18,550, compared to East Germany's figure of US\$12,420 (LT, 1989; UDN, 1990b). The respective per capita GNPs of South and North Korea in 1987 were US\$2,826 and US\$936 (LT, 1989; UDN, 1990b), while in the same year in China, the per capita GNP of the ROC was US\$5,075 while that of the PRC was US\$274 (LT, 1989; UDN, 1990b).

Beyond these differences of prosperity, the people of each of the people of the separated parts of these three divided countries share the same culture and history. In the case of China, the ancestors of most of the people on Taiwan moved to the island from the Chinese mainland either centuries or decades ago. Geographically speaking, Germany and Korea are divided by nothing other than an artificial line, while Taiwan is divided from the mainland by a narrow strait, where the two part of divided countries do differ is with respect to their political systems,

**Table 2. Overall Similarities Among Three Cases**

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|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. non-Communist part is richer</li><li>2. two parts belong to same nation</li><li>3. two parts share same history</li><li>4. two parts share same culture</li><li>5. two parts geographically adjacent</li><li>6. confrontation between different systems</li><li>7. division against people's will</li><li>8. reunification is national goal of at least one side</li></ol> |
|---|

political values, and political behavior. These differences arise from the fact that all three were divided as a result of conflict between two different and antagonistic systems (Domes, 1992, P. 25).

The division of Germany after World War II was totally against the will of its people. The division was the result of Germany's defeat and the subsequent occupation by the Four Powers. Likewise, Koreans and Chinese never expected that their countries would be divided in the late 1940's.

West Germany never abandoned the goal of national unification. In the preamble of its Basic Law (Constitution) of 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany claimed that the main purpose of the new state was to maintain Germany's unity as a nation. The unity and freedom of the entire German nation was to be achieved on the basis of free self-determination. In other words, West Germany claimed the right of "sole representation" for the whole of Germany (Kindermann, 1993, pp. 44-5). The position of West Germany did not change until 1972, when the Inter-German Treaty demonstrated that West Germany accepted the existence of two states within the German nation. Nevertheless, West Germany still argued that the two states could not be "foreign countries" to each other (Kindermann, 1993, p. 46). The implication was that the door to eventual reunification was always open.

East Germany put more emphasis on the normalization of relations between the two Germanies than on national reunification after 1949. Although East Germany was opposed to division, it is clear that it attached more importance to its own survival than to the unification of Germany (Kindermann, 1993, pp. 45-6). East Germany perceived the Inter-German Treaty as an institutionalization of the existence of two "foreign" states. Obviously, the two sides did not realize that Germany would one day be reunified when they concluded this treaty. However, this does not mean that the people of East Germany resisted national unification.

In the case of Korea, both governments and the people on both sides favor unification. The preamble of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, which was signed by the premiers of two Koreas on December 13, 1991, stressed "the yearning of the entire Korean people for the peaceful unification of the divided land, and recognized that current North-South relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship, stemming from the process toward unification (Kindermann, 1993, p. 48)." It is clear from this agreement that the goal of national unification is shared by the two Koreas.

The PRC always asserted that there is only one China, that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the PRC is the sole legal government of China. During the Cold War the ROC made a similar claim. After 1988, Taiwan's policy toward mainland China became much more flexible. Like East Germany, the ROC paid more attention to the normalization of relations across the Taiwan Strait than to national unification. This does not mean that the government of Taipei abandoned unification as a long-term goal. In the "Guidelines for National Unification," issued by the ROC government on March 14, 1991, the process of unification is divided into three stages: a short-term phase of exchanges and reciprocity; a medium-term phase of mutual trust and cooperation; and a long-term phase of consultation and unification. In other words, the ROC perceives the normalization of relations between Beijing and Taipei as the first step toward unification.

It is clear that in all three of the divided nations, unification is the national goal of at least one of the two sides.

### **The Crucial Differences between China and Germany/Korea**

Pragmatism in this study is defined as the choice of flexible and realistic policies in dealing with one's opponents. Diplomatic coexistence is regarded as an important variable to measure whether or not the separated parts of divided nations are willing to adopt a pragmatic policy toward each other.

**Table 3. Crucial Differences Between China and Germany/Korea**

Germany	Korea	China
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. two parts unequal in area</li> <li>2. two parts unequal in terms of population</li> <li>3. no experience of cooperation between the separated parts</li> <li>4. two parts of approximately equal international status</li> <li>5. military balance</li> <li>6. high-level political dialogue</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. two parts unequal in area</li> <li>2. two parts unequal in terms of population</li> <li>3. no experience of cooperation between the separated parts</li> <li>4. two parts of approximately equal international status</li> <li>5. military balance</li> <li>6. high-level political dialogue</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. two parts great difference in area</li> <li>2. two parts greatly unequal in terms of population</li> <li>3. unhappy experience of cooperation between the separated parts</li> <li>4. two parts very different in international status</li> <li>5. military imbalance</li> <li>6. low-level political dialogue</li> </ol>
pragmatic interaction between the separated parts	pragmatic interaction between the separated parts	lack of pragmatic interaction between the separated parts

As tests of the intensity of pragmatism in these three cases, Yung Wei has used "the stationing of formal representatives in each other's capitals", "dual representation in the UN," "direct trade," "direct exchanges of people," "face-to-face negotiation by government delegates," "formal dual representation in third countries," and "informal dual representation in third countries" (see table 5). By the end of early 1990, relations between West Germany and East Germany pass all of Wei's tests. Article 8 of the Inter-German Treaty of 1972 states that "the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic will exchange permanent missions." (Kindermann, 1993, p. 47) In the cases of Korea and China, no such exchanges have taken place. Before 1990, both West and East German were members of the UN while neither North nor South Korea was a member.<sup>2</sup> In China, the PRC has been the member of the UN since 1971, since which time the ROC has been excluded from the international organization.

West and East Germany, according to Article 7 of 1972 Treaty, agreed to "conclude agreements with a view to developing and promoting cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, traffic,

**Table 4. Crucial Differences Between Germany and Korea/China**

Germany	Korea	China
1. area of non-Communist part greater	1. area of Communist part greater	1. area of Communist part greater
2. military power of non-Communist part greater	2. military power of Communist part greater	2. military power of Communist part greater
3. no linkage between division and domestic factors	3. some linkage between division and domestic factors	3. strong linkage between division and domestic factors
4. comprehensive democratization	4. no comprehensive democratization	4. no comprehensive democratization
5. no serious ideological conflict between separated parts	5. ideological conflicts between separated parts	5. ideological conflict between separated parts
6. consensus on reunification model	6. no consensus on reunification model	6. no consensus on reunification model
7. easy rebuilding of power center after reunification	7. difficult to rebuild power center after reunification	7. difficult to rebuild power center after reunification
8. renunciation of use of force	8. threat of force	8. threat of force
9. no security dilemma	9. security dilemma	9. security dilemma
10. collapse of communist part	10. no collapse of Communist part	10. no collapse of Communist part
11. no perception of sovereignty as an issue	11. perception of sovereignty as an issue	11. perception of sovereignty as an issue
12. strong pragmatism	12. lack of strong pragmatism	12. lack of strong pragmatism
reunification	no reunification	no reunification

judicial relations, post and telecommunications, health, culture, sport, environmental protection..."(Kindermann, 1993, p. 47) Direct trade and exchanges of people were also permitted by East and West Germany (Kindermann, 1993, p.46). In Korea, none of these activities were allowed. Direct exchanges of people is allowed by the PRC and the ROC, although direct trade is still forbidden (Chang, 1992, p. 108).

**Table 5. A Comparison Paradigm Among Divided Nations in Terms of Pragmatism**

	Germany (FRG/GDR)	Korea (ROK/North Korea)	China (ROC/PRC)
Stationing of Formal Representatives in Each Other's Capitals	yes	no	no
Dual Representation in the UN	yes	no	no
Direct Trade	yes	no	no
Direct Exchanges of People	yes	no	yes
Direct Face-to-Face Negotiation by Government Delegates	yes	yes	no
Formal Dual Representation in Third Countries	yes	yes	no
Informal Dual Representation in Third Countries	yes	yes	yes

Sources: A 1990 updated table derived from Yung Wei. "The Unification and Division of Multi-system Nations: A comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches". *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, no. 8 (Maryland: University of Maryland, 1981), p. 73.

High level meetings between East and West Germany began in March 1970 with the meeting between Chancellor Willi Brandt and Prime Minister Willi Stoph (Kindermann, 1993, p. 47). Inter-Korea contacts started in May 1972. The director of the South Korean CIA met the North Korean president, Kim Il-sung, and Vice Premier Pak Song-chol of North Korea later paid a return visit to Seoul. From February 1989 to July 1990, eight government-to-government "preliminary meetings" were held in Korea (Kindermann, 1993, p. 48). In China, there have been no high level contacts across the Taiwan Strait.

The most impressive proof of Germany and Korean pragmatism is the way these countries accepted dual recognition. The number of countries which formally recognized both East and West Germany was very high and quite a few recognize both North and South Korea. Beijing has rejected dual recognition out of hand (see table 5). Informal dual representation in third countries, however, has been accepted by all of the three divided nations. (For a comparison of the three cases with respect

**Table 6. The International Status of Divided Nations (1990)**

	Germany (FRG/GDR)	Korea (ROK/North Korea)	China (ROC/PRC)
Number of Formal representatives in Third Countries	159/134	140/103	27/136
Number of Formal Dual Representatives in Third Countries	131	80	none

Sources: *Liberty Times* (Taipei: May 27, 1990), p. 11.

*China Times* (Taipei: July 23, 1990), p. 1

Tzong-Hai Shaw. "A Pursuit for Diplomatic Breakthrough and Westward Policy". (1990), mimeo, pp. 4, 21.

*Auswaertiges Amt* (June 1989).

to intensity of pragmatism, see table 5.)

It is therefore clear that the two Germanies were very pragmatical in their dealings with each other, while the two Koreas were quite pragmatical. In the Chinese case, lack of pragmatism has characterized interaction across the Taiwan Strait and there has been little opportunity for peaceful and equal coexistence, particularly since the Beijing leadership refuses to adopt a more flexible policy toward Taiwan.

The question we should ask is, why were Germany and Korea more pragmatic than China?

One reason is the relative size of the two halves of the divided countries. For example, West Germany is twice as big as East Germany, and North Korea is around 1.23 times the area of South Korea. In China, the PRC is around 266 times as big as Taiwan. In terms of population, West Germany is around 3.8 times as big as East Germany and South Korea is around two times the size of the North. The population of the PRC is around 55 times that of Taiwan.

The two Germanies and the two Koreas are clearly much more evenly balanced than China and Taiwan. This extreme imbalance between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan in terms of areas and population is one reason why the Beijing leadership has been unable to accept the political reality of the ROC on Taiwan. It is hard for the much bigger side to perceive Taiwan as an equal political entity.

The KMT and the Chinese Communist Party went through two periods of alliance before 1949. The first coalition was formed not long before the death of Sun Yat-sen (Sun died in 1925). The second coalition occurred during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). However, both of these



cooperations ended with civil war. The opposing parties in Germany and Korea had no such experience of cooperation. If it works, the experience of cooperation should be good for both sides. An unhappy experience of cooperation, such as that between the KMT and the CCP, is worse than none at all.

The international status of East Germany was approximately equal to that of West Germany in terms of the number of formal representatives stationed in third countries. Likewise, the international status of South Korea is similar to that of North Korea, although that of the latter is slightly lower. Compared with Germany and Korea, the two parts of China differ greatly in terms of degree of international recognition (see table 6).

West Germany was and North Korea is militarily stronger than their counterparts. The difference in military power between the PRC and the ROC, however, is much greater, especially when one takes into account the military support received by East Germany from the Warsaw Pact and by South Korea from the United States. The ROC is even weaker after the breakup of Taipei-Washington ties.

As discussed above, high level contacts between the two Germanies were achieved after 1972 and the first contacts between the governments of the two Koreas occurred in 1990. No contacts of this sort occurred between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan before 1991, though there was some unofficial dialogue.

In spite of the overall similarities between China and the other two divided nations, the crucial differences between China and Germany/Korea are in terms of area, population, and international status. In these terms, the two parts of China are much more unequal than the two Germanies or the two Koreas. Unlike Germany and Korea, there is a clear military imbalance and lack of high-level political dialogue between the two parts. The experience of cooperation between the KMT and CCP was totally unhappy; Germany and Korea have no such unhappy experiences. All of these differences could be crucial to the existence or lack of pragmatic interaction between the two parts of a divided nation.

### **The Crucial Differences Between Germany and Korea/China**

In October 1991, Germany was successfully reunified whereas Korea and China remain divided. The question that will be discussed in this section is why Germany, rather than Korea or China, reunified.

As mentioned above, both the area and the military capability of the non-Communist part of Germany was greater than that of the Communist part, while the reverse is true of Korea and China. (see tables 7-9). In all three cases, the non-Communist parts were richer than the Communist parts. Clearly, in the case of Germany, the bigger and

**Table 7. Military Comparison Between West Germany and East Germany (1990)**

Classification of military forces	West Germany	East Germany
Total Armed Forces		
Active	469,000	137,700
Reserves	853,000	323,000
Army	308,000	96,300
MBT	5,045	2,800
APC	3,636	3,370
Total CFE Arty	2,492	2,203
SSM	26	32
ATGW	2,453	703
RCL	99	0
ATK Guns	120	331
AD Guns	2,396	670
SAM	801	226
Helicopters	750	119
Navy	32,000	14,000
Submarines	24	0
Destroyers	6	0
Frigates	8	19
Corvettes	5	5
Missile Craft	40	11
Torpedo Craft	0	12
Mine Warfare	53	24
Support and Miscellaneous	52	15
Air Force	106,000	27,400
FGA	21 sqn	4 sqn
Fighters	2 wings	5 regt
RECCE	2 wings	2 sqn
EW	1 trg sqn	0
SSM	8 sqn	0
SAM	71 sqn	7 regt
RADAR	2 tac Air Control Commands	2 regt
Helicopter	3 sqn	1 regt
Transport	6 sqn	2 sqn

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp. 48-49, 66-68.

**Table 8. Military Comparison Between South Korea and North Korea (1990)**

Classification of military forces	South Korea	North Korea
Total Armed Forces		
Active	750,000	1,111,000
Reserves	4,500,000	5,000,000
Army	650,000	1,000,000
MBT	1,550	3,500
Light Tanks	0	650
APC	1,550	4,000
TOWED ARTY	4,000	2,500
SP ARTY	102	3,300
MRL	140	2,300
MOTARS	5,300	11,000
SSM	12	69
AD Guns	600	8,000
Navy	60,000	41,000
Submarines	3	24
Destroyers	9	0
Frigates	25	3
Corvettes	4	3
Missile Craft	11	34
Torpedo Craft	0	173
Coastal Patrol	0	6
Inshore Patrol	68	148
Mine Warfare	9	20
Amphibious	15	126
Support and		
Miscellaneous	9	3
Marines	25,000	0
Air Force	40,000	70,000
Bombers	0	3 regt
FGA	18 sqn	10 regt
Fighters	4 sqn	12 regt
Attack Helicopters	0	60
RECCE	1 sqn	0
Transport	36	280

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp. 166-169.

**Table 9. Military Comparison Between the ROC and the PRC (1990)**

Classification of military forces	ROC	RPC
Total Armed Forces		
Active	37,000	3,030,000
Reserves	1,657,500	1,200,000
Army	270,000	2,300,000
MBT	409	7,400-8,000
Light Tanks	950	1,200
APC	990	2,800
TOWED ARTY	>1,060	14,500
AD Guns	>400	15,000
Navy	30,000	260,000
Submarines	4	93
Destroyers	24	18
Frigates	10	37
Missile Craft	52	215
Torpedo Craft	0	160
Coastal Patrol	0	110
Inshore Patrol	18	380
Mine Warfare	8	52
Amphibious	26	58
Support and		
Miscellaneous	13	136
Marines	30,000	6,000
Air Force	70,000	470,000
Bombers	0	470
FGA	14 sqn	500
Fighters	14 sqn	4,000
RECCE	1 sqn	290
Transport	8 sqn	600
Helicopters	20	400
Strategic Missile Forces		
ICBM	0	8
IRBM	0	60

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp. 148-152, 177-178.

militarily stronger side also has the more prosperous economy whereas the more pro-sperous parts of China and Korea are smaller and militarily weaker. It was reasonable for the smaller, weaker, and less prosperous part of Germany (i.e., East Germany) to join the bigger, stronger, and more prosperous part (i.e., West Germany), since the people of the former could expect to enjoy a more prosperous existence after unification. On the contrary, the smaller, weaker, but more prosperous side in both Korea and China (i.e., South Korea and, particularly, Taiwan) are totally unwilling to join the bigger, stronger, but less prosperous side (i.e., North Korea and the PRC).

It is well known that the division of Germany resulted from the occupation of the four powers (the US, UK, France, and the USSR), after World War II. The German people themselves never expected that their country would be divided. Thus division was the result of external rather than internal factors. Unlike the German case, some domestic factors are involved in the division of Korea. Although the division resulted from the intervention of the US and the USSR after World War II, there was already confrontation between Kim Il-sung and the South Korean leadership. At least, Kim Il-sung, unlike the leaders of East Germany, was not handpicked by the Russians. The division of China was the outcome of a civil war and external factors had no relevance. The removal of the external factors which brought about the division of Germany was therefore crucial to the reunification of this country. During the late 1980s, the USSR was much more flexible on the issue of Germany reunification, and this change of attitude made unification possible. However, the unification of Korea and China depends entirely on the willingness of the separated parts themselves. Although the opposing sides in both Korea and China all cling to the goal of national unification, in neither of these cases have the opposing sides reached a consensus on when unification can take place. Korea and China therefore remain divided.

I mentioned earlier how the smaller and less prosperous part of Germany was willing to join the larger and more prosperous part. However, the smooth transition to unification depended upon the democratization of East Germany. The East German Communist Party resisted unification, and only when East Germany had a democratically elected government could its people's preference for unification be translated into reality.

Democratization permits a distribution of power between the separated parts after reunification. Democracy means that any body can lead the county and all political parties have a chance to rule the country. Peaceful unification would be very difficult without democracy as no party would be willing to accept a permanently downgraded status in a unified country. The reason why Korea and China have not been

unified is that neither North Korea nor mainland China have undergone democratization.

Ideology-oriented policy is different from interests-oriented policy. The former is based on faith and is neither flexible nor realistic. The latter is always in line with political reality and national interests, and for that reason is always subject to change.

In Germany, ideology was never a serious issue for the people, who were more concerned about their future prosperity. Marxist ideology and the Communist political system had been imposed on East Germany from outside, and there was no big ideological confrontation between West and East Germany. In East Asia, people are more used to clinging to a faith and hesitate to change their existing values. What is more, Communism in Korea and China was not really imposed by outside forces but was the result of internal developments. Ideological confrontation between the two parts of Korea and China is greater than that in Germany. Reunification is therefore much harder to achieve since in the two cases opposing sides strongly support their own values and political systems.

Both East and West Germany accepted a unified federal republic as the model for national unification (CT, 1989, UDN, 1989c). Beyond that, the West German constitution provided a legal and regularized framework for reunification. The political and administrative structures and laws for the united Germany were fully developed in West Germany, and these paved the way towards a swift national reunification and the rebuilding of a new power center (Domes, 1992, pp 23-4).

In Korea, South Korea has tended to favor a federation as the first step toward a unitary state (UDN, 1989a). North Korea, on the other hand, prefers a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea," within which each side would retain its existing system (UDN, 1989b). In China, the PRC has proposed "one country, two systems" as the model of reunification, but this is unacceptable to the ROC. It is clear that both Korea and China were not ready at all to achieve national reunification in 1990, not only in terms of the choice of the model of reunification but also in terms of political structures and laws to assure a smooth transition to unification. These difference and deficiencies would make it very difficult to build a power center in a unified country.

After 1972, neither East nor West Germany threatened to use force against the other. Article 3 of the Inter-German Treaty of 1972 states that "The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force (Kindermann, 1993, p. 47)."

In Korea, neither North nor South had officially renounced the option of using force against the other before 1990.<sup>3</sup> In China, the Beijing government has never abandoned the possibility of using force against

Taiwan. Security dilemmas have resulted, since neither South Korea nor the ROC on Taiwan were brave enough to fully cooperate with their counterparts, fearing that they would be doublecrossed. The threat of force engendered suspicion, making the prospects for reunification slim.

Reunification would be more likely to occur if neither of the two sides were under Communist rule (Domes, 1992, p. 23). Communist parties are normally characterized by authoritarianism and dictatorship, and they refuse to countenance other political systems or values. Without flexibility and pragmatism, however, the possibility of reunification is likely to decline. After all, peaceful unification cannot succeed unless the two sides build up good feelings towards each other.

In Germany, sovereignty was not an issue after 1972. Article 3 of the 1972 Treaty stated that "They [East and West Germany] reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the border existing between them and undertake fully to respect their territorial integrity." Article 4 stated that "neither of the two states can represent the other internationally or act in its name." Article 6 demanded that "the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on the principle that the jurisdiction of each of the two States is confined to its own territory. They shall respect each other's independence and autonomy in internal and external affairs." (Kindermann, 1993, p. 47) All of these articles show that sovereignty was not a serious issue anymore in Germany after 1972 and both parts of the country were inclined to choose a very pragmatic policy towards the other.

North and South Korea have not been as explicit as the Germans were in declaring that sovereignty is no longer an issue between them. This can be seen also in the absence of permanent missions in each other's capitals. The PRC has been much more insistent about sovereignty than either of the Koreas. It frequently claims to be the "sole representative" of China and has never been ready to concede the ROC a place in international affairs. Both parts of Korea and China have more or less maintained that sovereignty was still an issue and failed to choose a very pragmatic policy towards each other. This lack of pragmatism and the issue of sovereignty has clearly slowed down the process of reunification in these countries (for a summary of this section, see table 4.).

Despite the overall similarities between Germany and the other two cases, the crucial differences between Germany and Korea/China can be summarized as follows: The non-Communist part of Germany was both larger in terms of area and stronger militarily than the Communist part, while the reverse was true in Korea and China. There was a clear linkage between German division and external factor while the reverse was true in Korea and China (particularly in the Chinese case).

Germany was comprehensively democratized in 1990 while only the non-Communist parts of Korea and China have engaged in political reform. Compared with Korea and China, the ideological confrontation between the separated parts of Germany was much less serious. The strong consensus between the two parts of Germany concerning the model of reunification and the existence of feasible political structures and laws in West Germany both greatly enhanced the possibility of German reunification. There is no similar common ground between the separated parts of Korea and China however, making it much harder to build a power center in these two countries. East and West Germany, unlike Korea and China, renounced the use of force against each other after 1972. The collapse of Communism also facilitated the eventual reunification of Germany. Compared with Korea and China the separated parts of Germany were clearly much more pragmatic in their behavior towards each other and much more successful in putting aside the issue of sovereignty. All of these differences could be crucial causal variables leading to different outcomes, i.e., Germany was reunified in 1990 while Korea and China were not.

### **Conclusion**

By the use of Comparative Historical Study with emphasis on the Method of Difference, we are able to find the overall similarities and, more importantly, the crucial differences between Germany, Korea, and China. The findings of the study show that when the size, international status, and power of the separated part of a divided nation are approximately equal and there is no unhappy experience of cooperation between them, they are much more likely to adopt a pragmatic approach to each other. High level political dialogue is normally a good way for the separated parts to develop their relationship.

We find also that it is possible for a divided nation to be successfully reunified when the following conditions are satisfied: First, the larger of the two parts is also the more prosperous. Second, there is no linkage between division and internal factors. In other words, there is no inevitable and deeprooted hostility between the separated parts. Third, the divided nation is comprehensively democratized. Fourth, no serious ideological conflict exists between the separated parts. Fifth, the separated parts agree on a model of reunification and at least one of them is ready to provide feasible political structures and laws for eventual unification. Sixth, there is no longer a security dilemma between the separated parts, that is, they are not threatening to use force against each other. Seventh, the Communist Party has collapsed. Eighth, pragmatism continues to develop and sovereignty is not a serious issue anymore within the divided nation.



### Notes

1. For a detailed analysis of the lack of pragmatism in China, see the next few sections of this paper.
2. South Korea and North Korea successfully entered the UN as full members in 1991.
3. Article 6 of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North in 1991 stated that "The two sides shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other." See Kindermann, p. 49. The renunciation of the use of force was achieved then. Nevertheless, North Korea showed little sincerity in following the Agreement and the threat of force seemed always an alternative. For instance, the nuclear crisis immediately before the death of Kim Il-sung showed that the use of force against the south was always possible.

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