

The Essence of Beijing's Policy Towards Taiwan

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Beijing's policy towards Taiwan significantly changed after 1979. The new policy of Beijing leadership brought about a prudential but positive response of Taipei to Chinese mainland in 1987. The lack of mutual trusts between Beijing and Taipei, however, has always been a troubled issue from then on. The changing policy of Beijing towards Taiwan does not convince Taipei that a period of detente does come up. The "feeling" of Taipei towards Chinese mainland is not so good. In fact, the psychological complex of Taipei towards Beijing is strongly associated with the policy of the latter towards the former.

The purpose of this paper is to find out what the essence of Beijing's policy towards Taiwan is. The articles written by the research fellows of Chinese mainland leading institutes of Taiwan studies will be reviewed in this study. It is believed that their viewpoints greatly reflect

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the official policy of Beijing towards Taiwan. The focus of this paper will be on the research of Beijing's fundamental concepts and strategy towards Taiwan. Theoretical dimension and policy implications will be discussed comprehensively.

1. Beijing's Policy Towards Taiwan

China reunification is a restless goal of Beijing. On the basis of nationalism and historical reason, they frequently assert that reunification is inevitable. The emigration of Fukien and Kwangtung people into Taiwan provides the aged leaders in Beijing with excuse to support their points of view. National and cultural linkage between mainland and Taiwan, in fact, is one of the reason why China must be reunified. Anti-colonialism of Taiwanese during the period of Japanese occupation, in the eyes of Beijing leaders, shows how strongly the people on Taiwan identify themselves as Chinese. The linkage between Taiwanese and Chinese culture was furthered after the nationalist government moved into this island in 1949.¹

Beijing leaders announced many times that they are willing to resolve reunification issue peacefully. However, they can not promise the renunciation of the use of force. They argued that the people on Taiwan are not the targets of the threat of force. The force will be used only if foreign countries such as the US and Japan invade into Taiwan or the latter announces its legal independence. Beyond that, Beijing can

not abandon its right to use force against Taiwan since it never gives up its sovereignty over this island. Nevertheless, the four modernizations of Chinese mainland is a big job remained to be achieved under a peaceful condition. The leaders of Beijing do not wish to settle Taiwan issue by force unless the prospects of peaceful reunification are slim.²

Beijing suggests that the KMT and the CCP should sit down and negotiate. None of them should eat up the other. China should be unified under the model of “one country, two systems”. The international legal status of the ROC will be nullified since the PRC is the sole legal government of China. Taiwan as a special administrative region can participate into running the unified state. The KMT and the CCP might supervise each other after unification. Beijing strongly opposes the concepts of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”. The interference of foreign countries into internal affairs of China is not allowed unless the policy of foreign government is good for China unification. On behalf of Chinese mainland, the use of force against Taiwan is always the second choice only if Taipei clings to “one China” policy. The interaction across the Taiwan Straits should be direct, reciprocal and normalized.³ Beijing can not help accepting the fact that national reunification could be a gradual process.

A Chinese scholar, Chu Tian-Shun, argued that it is not reasonable for Taiwan to deny the model of “one country, two systems” for the sake of the security of the people on Taiwan. Chu said that the security of

Taiwan will be assured if the model can be accepted by Taipei. Beijing will not use force against Taiwan under this condition. Chu concluded that the so-called security of Taiwan is, in fact, referred to the security of the ROC.⁴ According to Chu, it seems not necessary to maintain the survival of the ROC since the security of the people on Taiwan can be always guaranteed. The arguments of Chu show that Chinese mainland ignores the fact that the people on Taiwan identify the ROC rather than the PRC as their country.

In response to the changing society of Taiwan, Beijing attempts to compete with not only the members of the KMT, but also those of the opposing parties, particularly the members who support or at least do not oppose China reunification. Nevertheless, we shall wait and see whether or not the CCP is willing to concede to the KMT in some respects before it is too late. After all, the loss of the KMT as a ruling party might enforce Chinese mainland to choose a hardline policy towards Taipei, which will not only bring about a disaster for Taiwan, but also will hurt the image and the existing economic achievements of Beijing government.

2. The Model of Divided Nation

Beijing leadership, as I put it previously, has concluded that China reunification is inevitable. Consequently, it is required that the model of unification be preconditioned by this conclusion. Moreover, on the basis of Chinese tradition, unitary state with a powerful central government

is a necessary condition to build up a unified nation. Any model which is inconsistent with these premises will be opposed by Beijing government. As a result, the models such as "multi-system state", "one country, two governments", "federate state" and "confederate state" are all denied by Chinese mainland. The autonomy of Taiwan is allowed although the demise of the ROC is required. Any model in which the survival of the ROC is possible will not be accepted by Beijing leadership. This could be the reason why the model of "one country, two systems" looks so generous towards Taiwan people, but so unyielding towards the legal status of the ROC.

3. The Contents of "One Country, Two Systems"

Insofar as the future model of China reunification is concerned, the government of Beijing always demands that "one country, two systems" is the only feasible way to deal with this issue. This model involves the following concepts: first, socialism and capitalism coexist; second, Taiwan is the part of China. The PRC is the sole legal government of China. The sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan is taken for granted. Reunification means that the status of Taiwan as an autonomy can be assured although separation is never allowed; third, "one country, two systems" is a model which is characterized by both unitary state and composite state.⁵ The bottom line of Beijing on behalf of China reunification is that the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan

is not negotiable. As a matter of fact, this model shows the complicated moods of Beijing towards Taiwan. On the one hand, it tries to compare Taiwan to Hong Kong. On the other hand, it recognizes that there is still the difference between Taiwan and Hong Kong. After all, Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, has the power to resist Chinese mainland.

In a word, the so-called “one country” refers to the PRC. There is only one Constitution, one national title and one central government. After 1949, the issue of “legitimacy” never exists since the ROC has ceased to exist from then on. Beijing strongly opposes the concepts such as “two Chinas right now, one China in the future”, “island China vs. mainland China”, “cultural China and economic China”, etc.. Any attempt to legalize and perpetuate “two Chinas” or to define “one China” in terms of an abstract sense such as economic, historic and cultural China will be refused.⁶ Ironically, a wishful thinking prevails on Chinese mainland. That is, the people on Taiwan are supposed to love China while the PRC is the sole legal government of China. The logic conclusion is therefore that the people on Taiwan are able to identify the PRC. National identification, in fact, can not be changed so easily and rationally. It would be a big mistake to oversimplify an issue which is too emotional to rationalize. The logic thinking of many scholars and politicians or Chinese mainland show that they might perceive this issue in a wrong way.

4. The Theoretical Dimension of "One Country, Two Systems" Model

Some of leading scholars on Chinese mainland spent a lot of energy to find out theory to support the concept of "one country, two systems". The purpose of it is to rationalize and legalize this model. The problem is that the theory must be reasonable on the one hand, and consistent with Marxism and Leninism on the other. The theoretical dimension of this model is derived from the Law of Contradiction which refers to confrontation but not separation, contradiction but interdependence, difference but association. That is to say, contradiction does not necessarily mean that cooperation between opposing parties is impossible. "Unification" sometimes follows "confrontation".⁷

Kuo Hsiang-Chih, the late deputy director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued that the coexistence of socialism and capitalism is always possible. No matter how successful socialism is, it does originate from capitalism. It is therefore inevitable that these two ideologies will be associated with each other. Kuo introduces Lenin's arguments that socialism can not survive unless it is able to absorb the great scientific achievements which only capitalism provides. It would be totally wrong to define the relationship between socialism and capitalism as an ideological confrontation. Kuo concludes that the eventual victory of socialism is derived

from its ability to coexist and compete with capitalism.⁸ The policy implications of these theories can be concluded as follows:

First, socialism is the leading ideology in China; second, the interests of Chinese people are dominant over that of classes; third, Taiwan is the part of China and the PRC is the sole legal government of China; fourth, capitalism is able to coexist with socialism because the former is still alive and active; fifth, Chinese mainland should take advantage of the productivity of Taiwan to further its economic developments; sixth, Chinese mainland and Taiwan should try to find out the similarity even if they are different from each other in many respects.⁹ The theoretical dimension of "one country, two systems" therefore implies the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan, the coexistence of socialism and capitalism and the demise of the ROC.

Integration theory with special reference to functionalism, neo-functionalism and communication is frequently discussed by western scholars. However, the Taiwan studies scholars on Chinese mainland refuse to accept these concepts. They argued that integration theory emphasizes the importance of the "process" rather than the "outcome" of unification. In other words, the integration may or may not be achieved. It depends on the results of the "process". They are anxious to assure the eventual unification as the outcome of the process. That is to say, the result must be very clear and certain. Consequently, they attempt to define the process of integration in terms of the outcome.

Any arrangement during the process of integration must fulfill the requirement of unification, even if the arrangement is inconsistent with political reality. It looks like a boy who demands his marriage with a girl even if they do not make acquaintance with and understand each other. Moreover, they tend to deny the theory of "convergence" as a feasible way to achieve reunification because it implies that the "two systems" will end up with "one system" eventually and probably the demise of socialism. Obviously, this argument is inconsistent with the concept of coexistence of the two systems.¹⁰

5. The Empirical Evidence of "One Country, Two Systems"

The model of "one country, two systems" is not only praised by Chinese mainland scholars as a development of Marxism and Leninism, but also justified by them as a historically feasible approach to achieve reunification. The most popular examples illustrated by them are the coexistence of feudal system and slave system during the Han Dynasty in ancient China, the coexistence of slave system and anti-slave system in the US before 1860 and the existence of the system of minority ethnic group on Chinese mainland.¹¹

In fact, Beijing more or less understands that it is difficult to compel Taiwan to accept "one country, two systems" model. The distribution of power across the Taiwan Straits, the survival of the ROC, the difference between Taiwan and Hong Kong and the feasibility of the

coexistence of the two systems in a unified state really concern the leaders in Taipei. Nevertheless, Beijing leadership would rather believe that the majority of people on Taiwan are still willing to accept this model.¹²

6. The Criticism of Taiwan's Mainland Policy

The critics of Taiwan's policy towards Chinese mainland argued that the three nos policy of Taiwan exists in name only. Taiwan tries to embody "one China, one Taiwan" through the internationalization of China unification issue. Taiwan tries to achieve peaceful evolution of Chinese mainland as well through political penetration and economic cooperation. The Guidelines for National Unification blocks rather than encourages the progress of reunification. Taipei is playing economic, foreign and Taiwan independence cards.¹³ Some critics agree that Taiwan does not emphasize its sovereignty over China mainland at this point. Perhaps Taiwan regards itself as another China or a state organized by a group of Chinese people. They said that once Taiwan abandons its legitimacy over Chinese mainland, will the legal status of the KMT break down.¹⁴ All of these arguments show the anxiety of mainland towards the future of Taiwan, i.e., the possible perpetual separation between mainland and Taiwan.

The scholars on Chinese mainland argued that national reunification should not be conditional. The so-called freedom, democracy,

constitutional system, rule by law and human rights are western values which should be separated from the issue of national unification. "Guidelines for national Unification", which was laid down by the ROC government, is therefore criticized as an approach to postpone the process of reunification, to deal with the contradiction within the island, to maintain the power of the KMT, and to improve the international image of Taiwan.¹⁵ They also commented that the guidelines are illusive and unrealistic. The primary purpose of it is to maintain the status quo.

The evaluation of Beijing on Guidelines for National Unification is clearly negative. The main reason is that it is inconsistent with Beijing's policy of three links, i.e., the postal, transportation and commercial links. Beijing particularly feels uncomfortable towards the contents of short term stage because this phase demands democracy on Chinese mainland and equal coexistence between Taiwan and mainland. According to Beijing, the equality between the central and the peripheral within a unified state is impossible in political sense.

Beijing also criticized "Taiwan experience" as a hostile ideology whose purpose is to destroy the status quo of Chinese mainland. Moreover, "Taiwan experience" implies the dominance of one system over the other and perhaps the demise of socialism. This is clearly inconsistent with the coexistence of the two systems.¹⁶

The focus of Beijing's criticism of Taiwan's mainland policy is on the deviation of the policy from unification, too much restriction on

mainland people, the lack of the equality of people between the two sides, political illusion and legal ambiguity. Ironically, Beijing praised Taiwan's "one China" policy on the one hand, but blamed Taipei for its postponement of the unification on the other.

7. The Objection to the Concept of "Equal Political Entity"

Beijing, as we know it, refuses to accept Taiwan as an equal political entity. The main point is that Beijing does not really oppose the concept of "political entity". What it can not accept is the concept of "equality". For example, Wu Da-Yin, a research fellow in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued that all of the governments can be regarded as political entity. China is a big political entity with a few sub-political entities in it. In this sense, there is no problem to perceive Taiwan as a political entity.¹⁷ Jen Pin-Shen said that Chinese mainland does not challenge the status of Taiwan as a political entity, but refuses to recognize Taiwan as an independent entity in the international society. According to international law, it is impossible to have two sovereign governments within a country.¹⁸ It is clear that Beijing can not allow Taiwan to emerge as an equal political entity because of the concepts such as legitimacy, the inseparability of sovereignty, mainland as Chinese main body, Taiwan as a sub-system in China, the lack of historical experience that Taiwan is equal with Mainland, the unequal power distribution across the Taiwan Straits and the fear of the potential

development of separatism within Chinese mainland.¹⁹

Basically, the concept of "equal political entity" is not acceptable in the political sense. Even if Beijing promised that everything is negotiable, it seems hard for it to concede on behalf of this issue.

8. The Perception of Germany and Korea Models

It will not be surprising to find that Beijing totally denies the feasibility of Germany and Korea models as paradigms to unify China after we observe its arguments discussed previously. First, Beijing argued that the division of Germany and Korea resulted from external factor while China division originated from civil war; second, Germany and Korea are divided into approximately equal two parts while China is the different story; third, the reunification of Germany means the demise of one system and the survival of the other. China reunification refers to the coexistence of the two systems.²⁰ All of these reasons, in fact, are employed to justify the dominant position of Beijing over Taiwan politically.

9. Hostility to "Pragmatical Diplomacy"

The hostility of Beijing towards "pragmatical diplomacy" which is enforced by Taipei government is developed from the concepts of legitimacy and sovereignty. If Beijing allows Taiwan to reenter international society, it means that the former accepts the models of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". This outcome will bring up with

the permanent division of China. The international legal status of Taiwan can be discussed on negotiation table although the previous position seems no way to negotiate. "Flexible diplomacy" of the ROC implies dual recognition and dual representation which tends to perpetuate the equal coexistence between Taiwan and mainland. Consequently, the framework of "one China" will break down.²¹ Chinese mainland regards "one China, two governments", "flexible diplomacy" as the same policy which opens the way towards Taiwan independence.²²

10. The Perception of Taiwan Independence and Taiwan Complex

The response of Chinese mainland to Taiwan independence is definitely negative. The radical change of the status of Taiwan will bring about a disaster for the people on this island.²³ However, it is noteworthy that Beijing is willing to make the difference between Taiwan independence and Taiwan complex. Many scholars on Chinese mainland recognize the existence of Taiwan complex which is an identification with the homeland. Taiwan complex is not nationalism, but a localism which is associated with mainland complex. Taiwan complex is totally different from Taiwan independence movement which results from the crisis of identification with Chinese people.

It is clear that Chinese mainland attempts to find a reasonable

explanation of what the localization of Taiwan is. Beijing tries to attract the people on Taiwan to stay in Chinese family by respecting the values of Taiwan complex. Nevertheless, Chinese mainland emphasizes the difference between Taiwan complex and Taiwan independence in order to remind the people on Taiwan of how much room Beijing government can tolerate.

11. The Attitudes Towards China Reunification

Beijing's perceptions of the possibility of China reunification are complicated. On behalf of domestic factors, Beijing leadership believes that the economic reforms of Chinese mainland and the coming of detente among nations bring about a quite optimistic prospects for China unification. However, the democratization of Taiwan and the economic, political and social gap between Chinese mainland and this island slow down the movement towards reunification. The lack of national trusts between the KMT and the CCP furthers the possibility of their misperceptions of each other. On behalf of external factor, Beijing never regards the US and Japan as positive element towards the eventual unification of China. For example, the arms sale of the US to Taiwan, the enforcement of Taiwan Relations Act and the substantial relationship between the US and the ROC are all of negative factors against China reunification. The US opposes Taiwan independence because it is not willing to damage the existing relations between itself and Chinese

mainland. Nevertheless, the strategy of the US, in the eyes of Beijing leadership, is to check Chinese mainland by Taiwan and to check the KMT by Taiwan independence movement. The policy of the US towards China always follows its own national interests.²⁴ Beijing leadership tends to believe that the impact of foreign countries with special reference to the US and Japan is always negative.

12. Beijing's Expectation of the Future

Understanding that the progress of unification might take time, Beijing stands for some sort of contact between the both sides. For example, the official representatives of Beijing and Taipei may pay private visits with each other or negotiate in the third country.²⁵ The economic relationship across the Taiwan Straits should be normalized. Because the economic development of Chinese mainland is in progress, Beijing suggests that Taiwan better negotiates with mainland as soon as possible. It is negotiable to see how to embody the concept of "one country, two systems". It is impossible for Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. However, the agreement of truce between the two sides can be signed. The KMT should change its "three nos policy" and open the way towards political negotiation unconditionally. The three links ought to be achieved and a Beijing-Taipei relations act should be enacted through the cooperation between the two sides. The matters which can be settled should be reesolved at this point.²⁶ Taiwan and

Fukien should sign agreements with respect to the exchange of goods, labor and funds.²⁷ The issue of legitimacy can be put aside temporarily but the Constitution of the ROC should not be enforced to prescribe the relationship between Taiwan and Chinese mainland. The enactment of a basic law by Taiwan could be an alternative.²⁸

13. The Logic Framework of Beijing's Policy Towards Taiwan

On behalf of the position of Beijing, national unification is necessary and inevitable because the people on Taiwan expect this outcome and, more importantly, they are Chinese. On the basis of this conclusion, Beijing leadership opposes any action which might delay the process of unification. "The Guidelines for National Unification" is therefore sharply criticized by Chinese mainland.

Historically, there is only one China no matter how divided this country has ever been. Nevertheless, it does happen that different systems sometimes coexisted in this country. It occurred as well in foreign countries. According to the Law of Contradiction, different ideologies and social systems normally confront with each other. However, unification is always the step next to confrontation. Socialism and capitalism are complementary with each other and should coexist peacefully. Based on the concepts of legitimacy and sovereignty, there is only one central government in a country. Consequently, there is only

one China and the PRC is the sole legal government of China. Taiwan is the part of China. Because most of the countries in the world accept this conclusion, the ROC does not exist anymore, particularly when the legitimacy of the ROC has been replaced by Beijing and most of the foreign countries have accepted this outcome.

All of these arguments are employed to support the core concept of Beijing's policy towards Taiwan, i.e., one country, two systems. That is to say, capitalism is allowed to survive on Taiwan and socialism is still the dominant system over Chinese mainland. Taiwan can maintain its existing political, economic, social and military systems. However, the demise of the ROC must be enforced since Taiwan is only a special administrative region in China.

Many conclusions are derived from "one country, two systems" concept. First, Chinese mainland refuses to accept western integration theory such as functionalism, neo-functionalism, communication and convergence. Beijing leadership does not recognize that China is a divided nation. In other words, Beijing can not accept Taipei as a government which equally coexists with Beijing. Any model associated with the survival of the ROC is ignored intentionally by Chinese mainland. For example, Beijing emphasizes the patriotism of the people on Taiwan, but hesitates to accept the fact that they identify the ROC rather than the PRC as their country. The concepts such as "pragmatical diplomacy", "one country, two governments" are all denied by Beijing

government.

As a matter of fact, the lack of a normalized relationship across the Taiwan Straits results from the debatable logic framework as discussed previously. First, Beijing demands the demise of the ROC because most of the countries in the world do not recognize Taipei anymore. This viewpoint ignores the fact that the foreign countries are forced to make a choice between Taipei and Beijing because of the unyielding position of Chinese mainland. They are not willing to break with the ROC if they can feel free to choose. It is totally unreasonable to force the other countries to accept Beijing's policy, and then employs this outcome to justify this policy.

Second, Beijing tends to regard national identification as a logic and rational choice, and forgets that it is normally an emotional choice. It is clear that Beijing oversimplifies this issue.

Third, It is highly debatable to precondition the process or unification by outcome. National reunification can be regarded as a goal. However, the process of integration is normally gradual and incremental. Politically, the shortest distance between two points is not really the straight line. Unfortunately, Beijing leadership frequently shows that straight line is their answer. Moreover, unification is a goal rather than a necessary outcome. Beijing should wait until the condition of unification is mature. During the process of unification, Beijing may try to foster a condition good for reunification, but should not impose its will

on Taiwan in order to enforce the achievement of the goal. In fact, compulsion normally alerts Taiwan and consequently the goal of reunification becomes too far to reach.

Fourth, Beijing refuses to recognize China as a divided nation. Germany and Korea models are not applicable to China case according to the leaders of Beijing. They argue that Chinese division results from civil war rather than the intervention of foreign countries. The imbalance of area and population between Chinese mainland and Taiwan justifies the dominance of Beijing over Taipei in the political sense. As a matter of fact, it is not persuasive at all to argue that China is not a divided nation just because the separation between the both sides originates from civil war. Suppose that China were divided into the North and the South in 1949. Is it appropriate to conclude that this is not a divided nation? It is also debatable to deny the status of Taiwan as an equal political entity as Chinese mainland because the former is much smaller than the latter. Taiwan and Chinese mainland are the likewise political entities who share the similar political functions. Whether or not a country is a divided nation should be judged on the basis of the function rather than the size of the opposing parties.

14. The Strategies of Beijing Towards Taipei

National reunification is the eventual goal of Beijing. All of its strategies towards Taiwan are aimed at this end. At first, it supports the

equal coexistence between the KMT and the CCP. This is to open the way for both sides to negotiate. Beijing accepts the values of Taiwan complex in order to please the people on Taiwan. Beijing encourages bilateral talks and announced that everything is negotiable. It is willing to sign an agreement of truce and to further the relationship between Taiwan and Fukien. Mutual visits at the high level are encouraged. All of these are strategies of rewards.

Beyond that, Beijing refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. This is a strategy of deterrence by punishment. That is to say, the threat of force is employed to deter the movement of Taiwan independence and foreign interference into Taiwan affairs. Beijing also tries to push Taiwan into the corner of international society. This is a strategy of compellence which is to force Taipei to concede its sovereignty to Beijing. Beijing leadership also attempts to reduce the bargaining chips of Taiwan through commercial links across the Taiwan Straits.

15. Conclusion

The main purpose of Beijing's policy towards Taiwan is to achieve China reunification under the model of "one country, two systems". Politically, the demise of the ROC is taken for granted. Only if this requirement is fulfilled, can a high autonomy of Taiwan be maintained.

It is clear that Beijing will not use force against Taiwan if Taipei continues its "one China" policy and always keeps the door open to Chinese mainland. The need for economic reforms on mainland requires a peaceful interaction across the Taiwan Straits. The use of force against Taiwan is always the second choice if Taipei will not choose a radical policy, i.e., Taiwan independence.

"Rewards", "deterrence by punishment" and "compellence" are three approaches of Beijing to deal with Taipei. The primary purpose of Beijing is to induce and to force Taiwan to negotiate with Chinese mainland. "Persuasion" and "coercion" are the basic strategies of Beijing to change the hard-line policy of Taipei towards mainland.

However, the flexibility of Beijing towards Taipei is very limited on behalf of the issues of legitimacy and sovereignty. Consequently, Beijing government pushes itself to play a zero-sum game with Taipei in the international society. The relationship between Taiwan and mainland can not be normalized as a result. Peaceful unification tends to be a dream too far. Beijing, in fact, refuses to choose a short cut to recreate the friendship across the Taiwan Straits.

Another dilemma implied in Beijing's policy towards Taiwan is that Chinese mainland regards the KMT's concepts of legitimacy and sovereignty as an illusion, but worried about the possible breakdown of the KMT once the ROC government abandons its claims of legitimacy over Chinese mainland. The end of Taiwan's mobilization against the

Communist China is clearly a step towards the normalization of relationship between the both sides. However, Beijing argued that this could be a step towards Taiwan independence. No matter what the future of Taiwan will be, Beijing leadership seems not brave enough to face the political reality at this point. The policy of Beijing towards Taiwan is aggressive enough to show its wish to build a unified state, but too arrogant to win the trust of the people on Taiwan.

Notes

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 8. Kuo Hsiang-Chih. “The Theory and Practice of the Concept of ‘One Country, Two Systems’”. *Taiwan Studies*. no.1 (1990), p.8.
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 10. For the discussion about functionalism, neo-functionalism, communication and the concept of “convergence”, see Kuo Hsiang-Chih. *op.cit.* and Luo Chien. “To Practice ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and to Develop Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao’s Style of Capitalism”. *Taiwan Research Quarterly*. no.1 (1987), pp. 13-17.
 11. Chen Bi-Shen. “The Negotiation Between Ching Dynasty and Cheng”. *Taiwan Research Quarterly*. no.2 (1983), p.9.
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 13. King Hung-Fan and Tung Yu-Elong. “The Evolution and Development of the KMT’s Policy Towards Chinese Mainland over the Past Ten Years”. *Taiwan Studies*, no.1 (1989), pp.28-29. Yao I-Pin. “A Study of Taiwan’s Political Development During the Period of 1990’s”. no.2 (1991), p.8. Also see Lee Chia-Chuan. “A General Comment on Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits.” Chiang Den-Ming (ed.). *Taiwan:1991* (Beijing: Chinese Friend-

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14. Ean Hsi-Chu. "An Analysis of Taiwan's General Diplomacy After 1979". *Taiwan Research Quarterly*. no.4 (1987), pp.39-40.
15. Jen Pin-Shen. "A Comment on Taiwan's 'Guidelines for National Unification' and the Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits". *Taiwan Studies*. no.3 (1991) pp.18-19.
16. *ibid.*, p.21.
17. Wu Da-Yin. "A Comment on 'Do Not Deny the Other Side As A Political Entity'". *Taiwan Studies*. no.2 (1991), p.2.
18. Jen Pin-Shen. *op.cit.*, p.21.
19. Lee Chia-Chuan. "A Thinking About Some Issues with respect to 'One Country, Two Systems'". *op.cit.*, p.13. Also see Yang Li-Hsien. "A Comment on the Concept of 'Equal political Entity'". *Taiwan Studies*. no.2 (1992), pp.20-23.
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21. Yao I-Pin. "The Past and Future of Beijing-Taipei Relationship". *Taiwan Studies*. no.3 (1989), p.6. Also see Wang Kuo-Hsien. "The Motivation and Outcome of Taiwan Authority to Implement Flexible Diplomacy". *Taiwan Studies*. no.4 (1989), p.1.
22. Lin Ching. "The Characteristic of Taiwan Independence on the Island". *Taiwan Research Quarterly*. no.1 (1992), p.47.

23. Lee Chia Chuan. "A Thinking about Some Issues with Respect to 'One Country, Two Systems'". *op.cit.*, p.13.
24. For the discussion about domestic factors, see King Hung-Fan and Tung Yu-Hung. *op.cit.*, pp.29,36. Li Wen. "An Advice to Mr. Lee Teng-Hui". Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.) *The Changing Politics of Taiwan and the Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits* (Beijing: Current Events Publishing Inc., 1991), p.14. For the discussion about external factors, see Kuo Hsiang-Chih and Chang Tsai-Chin. *op.cit.*, pp.10-11 and Wang Ko-Hwa. "External Factors and the Peaceful Reunification Across the Taiwan Straits". *The Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits* (Beijing: Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), p.810 and Chang Chin-Hsu. "US—Taiwan Relationship under the Changing Relations Across the Taiwan Straits". Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences(ed.) *Retrospects and Prospects: A Comment on the Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits* (Beijing: Current Events Publishing Inc., 1989), pp.175-176.
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28. Chu Tian-Shun. *op.cit.*.

China's political reform has attracted a lot of attention in the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in the past few years. The National Assembly, the highest constitutional standing organ in the country (Articles 37 and 154 of the Constitution), has already revised the Constitution twice since early 1991. It is expected that further revisions may be made in the next several years.

Recent constitutional reforms have been, and will continue to be, a prominent problem that merit to be discussed with regard to the prospects of the reform. Among various issues in the debate, an important one concerns the form of government. The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party in ROC is inclined to retain the

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20. The Chinese government will be concerned about the potential impact on its international relations if the United States is perceived to have supported the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. See the Chinese government's foreign policy white paper, *China's Foreign Policy in 1989*, Beijing: Foreign Affairs Press, 1990, pp. 1-2. See also the Chinese government's foreign policy white paper, *China's Foreign Policy in 1990*, Beijing: Foreign Affairs Press, 1991, pp. 1-2.
21. For the discussion about external factors, see Yan Jiaqi, 'China's Two Chinas' in *China's Foreign Policy: A Study of the United Front Strategy*, 'United Fronts and the People's Republic of China', The Foreign Policy Journal of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2007, and Chang Chen-Hua, 'The United Front Strategy under the Chinese People's Republic: An Introduction', Institute of Chinese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *International Programs & Communications Research Center for United Front Strategy*, Chinese People's Publishing House, 2005, pp. 173-174.
22. 'China Chases the East for the Middle East', *The Development of United Front Strategy*, Institute of Chinese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2007, pp. 26-27.
23. Yan Jiaqi, 'China's Foreign Policy and United Front Strategy', *China's Foreign Policy: A Study of the United Front Strategy*, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese People's Publishing House, 2005, pp. 173-174.