Da-chi Liao
政治學報；30期 (12/01/1998) P43-92
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Chyuan-jenq Shiau
政治學報；30期 (12/01/1998) P187-206
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In the postwar Taiwan, the public bureaucracy was shaped primarily by the islands authoritarian state. However, the United States also played a role in conditioning the public bureaucracy through its provision of aid of Taiwan. In order to assure national security and economic development, the authoritarian state carried out a series of economizing actions to reform the society and also the public bureaucracy was thus affected by the U.S aid mission.
After the withdrawal of U.S aid, the public bureaucracy was restructured again and Taiwan faced it’s the most rapid economic growth period consequently.
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Jih-wen Lin
政治學報；30期 (12/01/1998) P93-122
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The so-called single nontransferable vote under multimember district system（SNTV-MMD）, used only in Japan and Taiwan in selecting delegates to their national legislatures, has been associated clientelism, and factionalism. Electoral system, however, cannot explain the different electoral fortunes of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party（LDP）and Taiwan’s Kuomintang（KMT）. This paper argues that not only in SNTV-MMD encourages vote division on a constituency’s a preference structure. In a society like Japan, where the population is highly homogenous and no single issue dominates, the best campaigning strategy is to exchange particularistic goods or personal favors for votes. In a constituency where some divisive issue dominates, SNTV-MMD gives politicians the strong incentive to take distinctive issue positions, which is detrimental to the unity of the ruling party. In this case, being moderate or silent is the worst strategy. This paper develops a vote-buying model and a noise-making model to characterize the two scenarios, and then uses these models to explain the different fates of the LDP and the KMT.
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Fo-chuan Chang
政治學報；30期 (12/01/1998) P1-14
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How political authority can be reconciled with personal freedom is a problem at the heart of political thought. It is also perennial problem, the solution of which many a political philosopher has painstaking attempted. Jean Jacques Rousseau（1712-1778） used the idea of“general will”as central key to the problem. He said that sovereignty of a state is nothing less than the problem. He said that sovereignty of a state is nothing less than the exercise of general will（I’exercicie de la volonte general ）.As Rousseau had so successfully expounded the idea of“general will”, many scholars, including those honored as specialists on Rousseau, took it for granted that this term was “invented” by Rousseau. Similar notions can also be found in various encyclopedias and dictionaries.
However, such concepts are in fact misunderstandings. This treatise points to the erroneous concepts; traces the origin of the term“general will”to the seventeenth century; and expounds the consequent development of this idea.
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Yu-shan Wu
政治學報；30期 (12/01/1998) P123-186
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This paper takes an institutional approach to compare the constitutional reforms in the Republic of China and the Russian Federation. It first develops a triangular perspective to analyze various government forms, and comes up with the conclusion that semi-presidentialism is prone to conflict between the president and the parliament over control of government, and that a semi-presidential power as strong as under a presidential system. It then depicts the development of the constitutional order in the Russian Federation and the ROC, demonstrating that there are striking similarities between the two cases: Leninists past, democratic transition, assertive parliament, direct election of the president, a and substantial presidential powers. This brings about semi-presidentialism and its inherent conflict: the 1993 October putsch in Russia, and the parliamentary refusal to recognize the premier in Taiwan in 1996-97. Similar desire to keep firm presidential control over government promoted Boris Yeltsin and Lee Teng-hui to amend the constitution, and brought about a semi-presidential system dominated by the president. However, similar institutional. arrangements do not guarantee the ROC president can exercise the same power, for besides the Russian model there are the French Fifth Republic model and the Weimar Republic model that lead to different outcomes. Taiwan's constitutional future thus remains uncertain.
Institutional comparison between East Asia and Eastern rope is rare in the field of comparative politics. The few done are concentrated in comparing economic reforms', political decline, democratization', and consolidation of democracy in the two areas. As the "third-wave democracies" in East Asia and Eastern Europe have gradually matured, it becomes meaningful to study how their nascent democratic institutions function, and to make comparisons.' This paper sets out to examine the analytical frameworks in the field, and come up with a triangular perspective to analyze the constitutional order of the Republic of China (ROC) after the 1997 amendments, and the 1993 constitutional system of the Russian Federation. The two cases are chosen for they both belong to the category of "semi-presidentialism," a constitutional order that goes between the British-style "parliamentary" system and the American-style "presidentialism," and has been popular among the "third-wave democracies" when they chose their constitutional system. A comparative study of the Taiwanese and Russian cases may shed light on the interaction of political institution and the functioning of nascent democracies.
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Wei-Feng Huang
政治學報；30期 (12/01/1998) P15-42
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The emergence of welfare states has been explained by various theories. However, none of the exiting explanations seriously takes into account the context of parliamentary coalition. Thus, it is necessary to investigate into conditions under which politicians attempt to from a winning coalition with regard to specific welfare legislations. In this paper, I argue that parliamentary grand coalitions may be responsible for installment of the universalist type of the welfare state. John Hsieh’s model is applied to illustrate the conditions are met, the corresponding type of welfare state tends to be universalistic in nature. Two historical cases are used to support the above argument. This result, together with other theories, helps us to understand why welfare states differ in their institutional designs.
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