政治學報；57期 (2014/06) P1 – 30
關鍵字：老子御注, 常與變 , 理, 氣, 天命 , emperor's commentary of Lao Zu , permanence versus changes , Li (the great rule) , Qi (vital energy), mandate
This article deals with the internal context of Ming Tai Tzu's political philosophy, principally based on the analysis of the book Commentary of Dao Der Zhen Jing written by Ming Tai Tzu (明太祖, the founder of Ming Dynasty). There are three parts in this article. The discussion of Dao or permanence reveals the first part and the relationship among Dao (the great origin), Li (the great rule) and Qi (the vital energy) will be also discussed. The second part unfolds the discussions in two dimensions the legitimacy of the Mandate State, and the interaction of the monarch and the bureaucracy (or the gentry). The last part focuses on the ruling skills and the ideal of non-action that offers a kind of platform where tri-religions may occur to dialogue. Ming Tai Tzu had shown the methodology (or kind of Aesthetics) of governance in many writings, especially in Commentary of Dao Der Zhen Jing. The purpose in the commentary is to deliver the legitimacy of state building by initiating or re-shaping a metaphysical system that not only monitors the statecraft but also embraces or orders the world. And through the activity of making commentary of the Daoist texts, Ming Tai Tzu discussed the dialectical relationship between ＂classics＂ (經) and ＂changes＂ (變). He emphasized that changes can be normal and have the legitimacy just under the qualification by following the great rule (Dao, Li, or permanence). There won't be any variations that should alter the ultimate. And this is valid not only in the sphere of daily living, but also in the sphere of governing. The basic understandings of body politics that come from ancient philosophers are also exemplified in Ming Tai Tzu's ruling philosophy. And through this ＂scriptures postil the commentators＂ tradition, Ming Tai Tzu revealed his political ideas, strengthened his influence and shared or even dominated the power of discourse.
政治學報；57期 (2014/06) P31 – 51
關鍵字：政府管制 , 「國家－市場」關係, 國有化, 管制理論, 獨立管制機關 , state regulation, state-market relations , nationalization, regulatory theories, independent regulatory agency
By analyzing and comparing two models of state regulation: statutory regulation with independent regulatory agency and nationalization with state ownership, this article explores the rise of regulatory state in the past decades and illustrates why and how the state manages the market. It argues that the latter model was abandoned because of its low efficiency and ambiguous responsibilities. The states decided to adopt privatization and replace it with the former model, which is more applicable. When the state faces the market based on the private ownership, it plays the role of impartial referee and actively participates in the market to promote competition and improve efficiency. Setting up an autonomous regulator reduces the uncertainty caused by political intervention and strengthens policy credibility. While delegating the regulatory authority to independent regulatory agencies, the policies will not be intervened by politicians and keep stable. The autonomy of independent regulators will escape from administrative involvement and increase its expertise and policy continuity. Independent regulatory agencies are now a better and more feasible institutional design. Moreover, this article examines the development of the theories of state regulation and critical issues and proposes three distinct features. First, the empirical evidence emerged earlier than theoretical discussion. Second, the theories have shifted from normative to positive orientation. Third, the level of analysis and analytical approach have moved from macro-level systematic to micro-level institutionalist. At the end, this article points out the predicaments of the development of regulatory system and directions for future research.
政治學報；57期 (2014/06) P53 – 76
關鍵字：國際制度, 國際關係理論, 表決制度 , 國際貨幣基金, international institutions , international relations theories, voting system, IMF
This paper re-examines an analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions. Realists, liberal institutionalists, and Constructivists particularly disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international stability. Realists insist that institutions are fundamentally a function of the distribution of power in the world. Their analysis is based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and presents a pessimistic analysis on state behavior. Liberal institutionalists directly challenge the proposition of Realism, arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and then change state behavior. Institutions have the capability to move states away from conflict. On the contrary, the central aim of Constructivists is to alter the constitutive and regulative norms of the international system so that states stop thinking and acting according to anarchy. States would not think in terms of self-help or self-interest, but would instead define their interests in terms of the international society. Besides, states may pursue a conditional cooperation in the face of international anarchy. Hence, this paper is to evaluate the limitation of cooperation and the effectiveness of international institutions by analyzing the voting system: voting rights and voting methods. The task involves answering questions: Which is the most causal logic that explains the effectiveness of international institutions? Are these different theories that explain how China works in ＂Quota＂ Reform of IMF and its Voting System? Does the evidence support these theories?
趙建民(Chien-Min Chao) ； 張鈞智(Chun-Chih Chang)
政治學報；57期 (2014/06) P77 – 100
關鍵字：全國人民代表大會 , 制度化 , 威權韌性, 專門委員會 , National People's Congress, institutionalization , authoritarian resilience , Permanent Committee
As China's society is showing signs of civil autonomy and defiance, scholars wonder whether the legislatures, once a ＂rubber stamp,＂ are gaining a new life by becoming more autonomous vis-a-vis the resilient party-state. Employing a new operational definition of institutionalization by supplementing the concepts borrowed from existing literature in China's National People's Congress (NPC), this article tries to analyze the institutional developments of the permanent committees in the NPC. The findings suggest that the NPC committees have indeed made great headway on the issue of ＂complexity＂ and even included some ＂universal criteria＂ in their rules, but problems with the ＂boundness＂ still linger. In the area of ＂complexity,＂ the growth of committees in both size and numbers, recruitment of younger but better educated members, the emergence of seniority system in the selection of leadership and the rising trend towards specialization, have all contributed to building up capacity of the institution. While the function of law-drafting has been declining, committees have been granted more powers in the deliberation process, and hence more regularization. On the other hand, about 80% of committee members still retain CCP membership. More NPC Standing Committee members are serving in permanent committees than before, while shortened time served by committee members have added additional challenges to the consolidation of ＂boundness.＂ In conclusion, the article substantiates the logic of ＂authoritarian resilience＂ by pointing out that although more specialization is obviously discernible in the NPC committees, autonomy remains weak.