寇健文(Chien-Wen Kou) ； 陳方隅(Fang-Yu Chen)
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P59 – 103
關鍵字：中共, 後極權主義, 財經高官, 發展型國家, 菁英甄補 , China, developmental state , economic technocrats , elite recruitment , post-totalitarianism
Political recruitment, a crucial function of a political system, is strongly affected by the nature of the system. Analyzing 258 ranking officials who have ever occupied a post at the full or vice-minister levels in the ministries of macroeconomic regulation and control, this paper demonstrated the impact of the duality of the Chinese political regime-both developmentalism and post-totalitarianism-on the recruitment of economic technocrats. The attribute of developmentalism leads to the rise of professionalism. Most economic technocrats completed graduate studies and were trained in economics and management. About a quarter of these technocrats had overseas study experiences and usually obtained a degree from overseas universities. Moreover, these officials' career pattern revealed that they were usually promoted from ministries of macroeconomic regulation and control, and usually transferred to another post in these ministries. In the meanwhile, political credentials remained important for the mobility of economic technocrats. The overwhelming majority of economic technocrats were CCP members and the experience of Party posts became important in the upward-mobility of these officials.
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P29 – 58
關鍵字：多層分析, 投票參與 , 單一選區兩票制 , Mixed-Member Majoritarian System, multilevel analysis, voting participation
The major purpose of this article is to examine whether voters' perception and evaluation of the new electoral rule, mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM), affected their voting participation in the 2008 Legislative Yuan election. Furthermore, a multilevel model is applied in this study to include both aggregate and individual level data to account for voters' participation in this election. It is found that voters' perception of the new electoral system produces significant impact on their voting participation. The more voters understand about the new electoral rule, the more likely they cast their votes. The results of the multilevel modeling indicate that although the aggregate level factors, including electoral competition, rate of population move-in, population density, and the number of candidate in each district, have no ”direct” effect on voting participation, there exists interactive effect of electoral competition at the aggregate level and partisan strength at the individual level on voters' participation. Partisan strength's effect on voting participation grows stronger if the level of competition becomes stronger in the district.
黃德福(Teh-Fu Huang) ； 廖益興(Yih-Hsing Liao)
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P1 – 27
關鍵字：並立式混合選舉制度, 國會政治, 選舉制度改革, 選舉競爭, congressional politics , electoral competition, electoral reform, the parallel mixed-member electoral system
The electoral system is the most fundamental mechanism for a democracy. It affects the development of party systems and even the operation of democratic politics in a given society. However, the reform of electoral systems is a difficult challenge of political engineering. It can only change the strategic choices of political parties and politicians in favor of the status quo when usually entering the political agenda together with other important issues. The motive of the reform of Taiwan's electoral system of legislators lies in the potential deficiencies of the existing SNTV system. The prevailing consensus of ”reduce the legislators by half” appeal made an important step on it by incorporating the subject of the reform of electoral system into the political agenda of congressional reform. The following elections of the president and legislators in 2004 did play the indispensable roles on the successful reform of Taiwan's electoral system of legislators. Based on the strategic consideration of electoral competition and party interests, no matter whether they are the rational calculation of self-interest or the coerced endorsement with tears, every political parties and legislators finally accepted the design of the parallel mixed-member electoral system for Taiwan's elections of legislators.
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P105 – 154
關鍵字：中國研究 , 財政分權, 租稅, 國家能力, 區域不平等 , China study, fiscal decentralization, regional inequality, state capacity, taxation
How does authoritarianism shape the tax regime as a fundamental dimension of state capacity? Following the predatory state theory, I claim that the authoritarian ruler appreciates stronger monopoly of political resources and bargaining power for maximizing the tax revenue, but also be frustrated by higher monitoring and agency costs. When the authoritarian ruler raises and centralizes the tax revenue, it usually leads to the apportionment of expenditure and the expanding predatory behaviors of the local agency. Also, the fiscal expenditure is in favor of the administrative spending and some infrastructure rather than education, health-care and social welfare. Therefore, it leads to the rent-seeking of cadres and the inversed redistribution between the rich and the poor.The case study of Chinese sharing tax reform in 1994 demonstrates the effects of fiscal centralization under authoritarianism. After 1994, the central government extracted greater share of tax revenue as well as apportioned the expenditures, and the local government reduced the public services as well as strengthened the exploitation to the peasants. The statistical evidences from the provincial panel data between 1978 and 2004 confirmed that the fiscal reform increased the local administrative expenditure and deteriorated the regional inequality in China. Summing up, the authoritarian fiscal centralization can hardly enhance the state capacity; instead, it suffers from the principal-agent problem, which constrained the effectiveness of both the administrative capacity and the redistributive policies.