寇健文(Chien-Wen Kou) ； 陳方隅(Fang-Yu Chen)
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P59 – 103
關鍵字：中共, 後極權主義, 財經高官, 發展型國家, 菁英甄補 , China, developmental state , economic technocrats , elite recruitment , post-totalitarianism
中文摘要
本文認為中共目前具有「資本主義發展型國家」和「後極權主義」兩種特性，這兩種特性共同影響政治菁英的甄補。本文以1978～2008年之間，被中共拔擢擔任宏觀經濟調控部門副部級以上職務的258人為對象，探討中共政權二元特性對財經高官甄補的影響。受到「發展型國家」特性的影響，財經高官的市場經濟專業性日益提升，反映在研究生以上學歷者已成主體，具有經貿管理專業的比例愈來愈高，前往歐美國家留學的比例也逐漸提升，並以攻讀學位為主體。財經高官的工作經歷多半以宏觀經濟調控部門為主，出現「系統內流動」的趨勢，惟宏觀經濟調控部門與專業經濟部門、國有企業之間的相互流動仍占一定比例。在「後極權主義」特性的影響下，政治憑證對於財經高官的仕途發展也很重要，表現在財經高官的黨員比例極高，同時隨著職務級別提升，具有專任黨職經歷的比例明顯提高。不過，入黨年齡已經不再是重要的政治憑證。
英文摘要：
Political recruitment, a crucial function of a political system, is strongly affected by the nature of the system. Analyzing 258 ranking officials who have ever occupied a post at the full or vice-minister levels in the ministries of macroeconomic regulation and control, this paper demonstrated the impact of the duality of the Chinese political regime-both developmentalism and post-totalitarianism-on the recruitment of economic technocrats. The attribute of developmentalism leads to the rise of professionalism. Most economic technocrats completed graduate studies and were trained in economics and management. About a quarter of these technocrats had overseas study experiences and usually obtained a degree from overseas universities. Moreover, these officials' career pattern revealed that they were usually promoted from ministries of macroeconomic regulation and control, and usually transferred to another post in these ministries. In the meanwhile, political credentials remained important for the mobility of economic technocrats. The overwhelming majority of economic technocrats were CCP members and the experience of Party posts became important in the upward-mobility of these officials.
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蕭怡靖(Yi-Ching Shiao)
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P29 – 58
關鍵字：多層分析, 投票參與 , 單一選區兩票制 , Mixed-Member Majoritarian System, multilevel analysis, voting participation
中文摘要
2008年立法委員選舉首度採行「單一選區兩票制」，投票率卻創下1992年以來立委選舉的歷史新低，這是否與選民對新選制的認知程度有關，莫不令人感到好奇。本文旨在探討選民對新選制的認知與評價是否影響其投票參與，並以兼顧總體與個體層次的多層模型進行分析。研究結果顯示，選民對新選制的認知顯著影響投票與否，對新選制的認知程度愈高，投票參與的相對機率愈高，惟選民對新選制的評價則對投票參與無顯著影響。此外，從學理上所建構的選舉競爭度、人口遷入率、人口密度及候選人數等總體層次的選區因素，在多層模型中對選民投票與否並不具顯著的直接影響力，但選區競爭程度與選民的政黨認同則具正向的交互作用。在選舉競爭程度愈高的選區，黨性（尤其是高度黨性）對選民投票與否的解釋力愈強。
英文摘要：
The major purpose of this article is to examine whether voters' perception and evaluation of the new electoral rule, mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM), affected their voting participation in the 2008 Legislative Yuan election. Furthermore, a multilevel model is applied in this study to include both aggregate and individual level data to account for voters' participation in this election. It is found that voters' perception of the new electoral system produces significant impact on their voting participation. The more voters understand about the new electoral rule, the more likely they cast their votes. The results of the multilevel modeling indicate that although the aggregate level factors, including electoral competition, rate of population move-in, population density, and the number of candidate in each district, have no ”direct” effect on voting participation, there exists interactive effect of electoral competition at the aggregate level and partisan strength at the individual level on voters' participation. Partisan strength's effect on voting participation grows stronger if the level of competition becomes stronger in the district.
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黃德福(Teh-Fu Huang) ； 廖益興(Yih-Hsing Liao)
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P1 – 27
關鍵字：並立式混合選舉制度, 國會政治, 選舉制度改革, 選舉競爭, congressional politics , electoral competition, electoral reform, the parallel mixed-member electoral system
中文摘要
選舉制度為最基本的民主政治機制，足以影響政黨體系發展或甚至民主政治的健全運作；而選舉制度改革是一項困難的政治工程，通常必須與其他重要議題一起進入議程，才能改變政黨與政治人物傾向維持現狀的策略選擇。台灣立法委員選舉制度改革的啟動，在於現有單記不可轉讓投票制潛存的諸多缺失引發普遍不滿，伴隨「立法委員席次減半」訴求的風起雲湧，立法委員選舉制度改革的議題乃得以順勢進入政治議程，邁出了選舉制度改革的重要一步；而在面對2004年接踵而來的總統選舉與立法委員選舉，基於選舉競爭與政黨利益之策略考量，不論是自利理性計算或被迫含淚背書，各個政黨與立法委員選擇接受並立式混合選舉制度的改革方案，才是立法委員選舉制度改革成功的真正關鍵因素。
英文摘要：
The electoral system is the most fundamental mechanism for a democracy. It affects the development of party systems and even the operation of democratic politics in a given society. However, the reform of electoral systems is a difficult challenge of political engineering. It can only change the strategic choices of political parties and politicians in favor of the status quo when usually entering the political agenda together with other important issues. The motive of the reform of Taiwan's electoral system of legislators lies in the potential deficiencies of the existing SNTV system. The prevailing consensus of ”reduce the legislators by half” appeal made an important step on it by incorporating the subject of the reform of electoral system into the political agenda of congressional reform. The following elections of the president and legislators in 2004 did play the indispensable roles on the successful reform of Taiwan's electoral system of legislators. Based on the strategic consideration of electoral competition and party interests, no matter whether they are the rational calculation of self-interest or the coerced endorsement with tears, every political parties and legislators finally accepted the design of the parallel mixed-member electoral system for Taiwan's elections of legislators.
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林宗弘(Thung-Hong Lin)
政治學報；47期 (06/01/2009) P105 – 154
關鍵字：中國研究 , 財政分權, 租稅, 國家能力, 區域不平等 , China study, fiscal decentralization, regional inequality, state capacity, taxation
中文摘要
本文從掠奪性國家的財政模型出發，分析威權主義下國家財政能力的變遷。威權體制與民主體制相比之下，統治者的資源壟斷與議價能力高，因此更傾向財政集權；但其租稅的交易成本，尤其是監督納稅人的交易成本與委託代理成本也偏高，因此，在租稅收益收歸中央、收稅成本與財政支出向下級或地方政府攤派時，其下級單位或地方代理人更容易掠奪納稅人，其財政支出則偏愛增加行政官僚本身的利益，結果，威權體制容易導致行政官僚開支的膨脹與財政支出在貧富之間的逆向分配。本文以中國大陸1994年分稅制改革為例，以1978～2004年間29省分省數據的固定效果模型確認了財政集權的負面後果。筆者發現在威權主義財政收入集權的趨勢下，地方政府承擔財政支出與負債，引發行政官僚人事與管理費用擴張，排擠教育、衛生與社會保險等公共支出，並加重對農民的剝削，造成貧富差距與區域差距的惡化，呈現了威權主義對國家財政收支管理效率與租稅公平的不利影響。
英文摘要：
How does authoritarianism shape the tax regime as a fundamental dimension of state capacity? Following the predatory state theory, I claim that the authoritarian ruler appreciates stronger monopoly of political resources and bargaining power for maximizing the tax revenue, but also be frustrated by higher monitoring and agency costs. When the authoritarian ruler raises and centralizes the tax revenue, it usually leads to the apportionment of expenditure and the expanding predatory behaviors of the local agency. Also, the fiscal expenditure is in favor of the administrative spending and some infrastructure rather than education, health-care and social welfare. Therefore, it leads to the rent-seeking of cadres and the inversed redistribution between the rich and the poor.The case study of Chinese sharing tax reform in 1994 demonstrates the effects of fiscal centralization under authoritarianism. After 1994, the central government extracted greater share of tax revenue as well as apportioned the expenditures, and the local government reduced the public services as well as strengthened the exploitation to the peasants. The statistical evidences from the provincial panel data between 1978 and 2004 confirmed that the fiscal reform increased the local administrative expenditure and deteriorated the regional inequality in China. Summing up, the authoritarian fiscal centralization can hardly enhance the state capacity; instead, it suffers from the principal-agent problem, which constrained the effectiveness of both the administrative capacity and the redistributive policies.
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