國際制度在國際霸權競逐的權力作用

The Power Effects of the International Institution in the Process of International hegemonic Competition

陳欣之

政治學報;40期 (2006/06) P115-148

關鍵字:國際制度, 路徑依存, 議題控制, 權力, 霸權, Agenda control, hegemony, international institutution, path-dependence, power

中文摘要

國際關係十分重視權力對國家行為的作用,不過各種國際關係理論,對於權力的定義,本質與運用方式,並沒有提出令人滿意的的解釋。大部分的 國際關係論述,仍然以掌握資源的多寡,作為衡量大小的指標,忽視宰制國家決策環境與決策選項的其他種類權力面貌。權力雖然是國際關係的一個重要概念,不過國際關係隊與此種概念的各種方式及內涵,並沒有深入的 探索。

霸權對國際制度的創設,有重大的影響,不過霸權對於國際制度的操縱,以及霸權運用國際制度運對新興挑戰國的各種可能作為,值得更多的探索。國際制度內由於霸權的存在,呈現出國家間權力不對稱的現象,而且霸權經由創設國際制度,滿足與實現其利益,並鞏固其優勢的霸權地位。最後,霸權推動國際制度與促進國際合作時,透過限制決策背景與選項,削弱其他國家與霸權較勁的可能。

尋求國際合作的過程中,霸權利用對議題的控制,以及限制其他國家決策選項的方式,展現霸權所擁有的權力,迫使其他國家處於不利的決策地位,進而達成符合霸權最大的國際合作運作模式,故而國際制度的運作中,存在著贏家(winner)與輸家(loser),而且隨著國際制度的運作,不斷強化贏者的地位,提升輸家退出此種制度尋求其他解脫的成本,迫使弱者繼續在不利於本國利益的國際制度中,陷入兩海相權取其輕的 決策困境。

中共與美國的霸權競爭態勢,已成為近年來最熱門的 國際關係課題,中共的權力地位或許十分驚人,不過在世界貿易組織的表現卻處處受限,中共取代美國,主導全球主要國際制度的地位,顯然有一大段距離,無論如何,中共仍會與美國在國際制度之內,上演全力爭奪的老戲。

英文摘要:

Power has been an important factor in deciding the state’s behavior in the international system; however, the International Relations Theories did not propose satisfied explanations on the issue of definition, nature and the exercise of power. Most of the international relations theories insist that the measuring index of power is the amount of capabilities. They ignore the other power faces which demonstrate by means of dominating the decision-making environment the decision agenda.

Hegemony has great influence on the establishment of international institution and the ways how hegemony manipulates the international institution deserve more attentions. There is power asymmetry in the international institution because of the existence of hegemony. Besides hegemony exercised her power and fulfilled her intere3sts through the function of the international institution, which consolidate further her predominant position in the international system.

In the process of international cooperation, hegemony limited the rational choice bargaining, which demonstrate the hegemony’s power in the international institution and archive a certain kind of international cooperation in which the hegemony becomes beneficent and the other countries were forces to accept an unfavorable terms. So, there are we winner and loser in the international institution. The winner becomes powerful; and the losers are trapped in a dilemma between the high cost to quit the international institution and the unfavorable position in such international institution.

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我國「雙首長制」為什麼不會換軌?-制度因素之分析

Why Cannot the ROC’s Semi-presidentialism “Alternate”? -In Light of Institutional Mechanism

蘇子喬

政治學報;40期 (2006/06) P41-84

關鍵字:法國第五共和, 換軌, 單記非讓渡投票制, 憲政體制, 雙首長制, alternating, constitutional system, dual-leadership, the French Fifth Republics, semi-presidentialism, single non-transferable vote

中文摘要

我國雙首長制的憲政運作為什麼不會像法國第五共和一樣呈現換軌的特色?本文將以法國第五共和的憲政運作為觀察參考的依據,探討我國憲政運作無法順利換軌的制度因素。
法國的換軌式憲政運作之所以能夠順暢,主要是基於以下幾個機制的輔助:第一,法國國會議員選舉所採取約兩輪投票塑造了國會中穩固國團結的左右兩大聯盟,迫使總統在無國會多數支持時,不敢忽視國會多數的實力;而我國立法委員選舉所採取的單記非讓渡投票制(SNTV)卻導致立法院中無法形成穩固團結的多數黨(或聯盟)。第二,法國的行政指揮系統是一元化的,因而當憲政運作換軌至總理主政時。總統沒有太多行政資源可以于預總理的施政;而我國的行政指揮系統卻是二元化的。第三,法國總統在憲法上對總理沒有主動免職權,因此可以確保在總理主政時總理只須對國會負責而不對總統負責;而我國總統在實際憲政運作上對行政院院長則有主動免職權。第四,法國總統有主動解散國會的權力。使得新總統上任時可以主動塑造與自己一致的國會多數;我國總統則無主動解救立法
院的權力。第五,法國總統選舉採取的是兩輪對決制,且與國會議員選舉皆是兩輪投票制,因而大幅提高新總統成功塑造與自己一致之國會多數的機率;然而我國總統選舉採取的是相對多數制,而且立委與總統選舉制度迥然不同。以上五項制度因素中,前三項因素是法國在面臨「新國會vs舊總統」的情況時。憲政運作得以順暢地由總統制換軌到內閣制、而我國卻不能的原因;後兩項因素則是法國在面臨「新總統v.s.舊國會」的情況時,憲政運作能夠順暢地從內閣制換軌到總統制,而我國卻不能的原因。

就此看來,換軌式的憲政運作乃是建立在總統的憲法權力、政黨體系、國會選舉制度,縝統選舉制度、行政指揮建制各個面向的整體配套上。任一環節都非當重要。因此,如果我國未來的憲政體制仍然維持雙首長制的架構,並且希望如同法國呈現換軌式的憲政運作,在憲政工程上便應全面顧及確保換軌順暢的整體配套設計,而不應只是偏重其中某個面向。

英文摘要:

The paper tries to explore why the ROC’s constitutional system, so called semi-presidentialism(dual-leadership system),cannot work like French Fifth Republic’s,“alternating”between presidential and parliamentary phase. Focusing on the institutional mechanism, the paper indicates five critical factors which result in different constitutional outcomes in France and the ROC.

First, the two-ballot system for the election of the French National Assembly members has contributed to two firm political allices in the National Assembly, while the ROC’s SNTV system for the election of legislators shapes an unstable multi-partism in the Legislative Yuan. Second, the administrative command system in frence is unity, while it isn’t in ROC. Third, the French president ins’t granted the constitutional power to dismiss the head of the cabinet at will, but the president of ROC seems to own this power, in view of the empirical constitutional exercise. Fourth, the French president can dissolve the National Assembly voluntarily, but the ROC president cannot dissolve the Legislative Yuan unless the latter passes a vote of non-confidence on the Executive Yuan. Fifth, the French presidential election adopts majority vote(runoff election),while the ROC presidential election adopts plurality vote.

Among these institutional factors, the first three enable the French constitutional system to alternate from presidential phase to parliamentary phase in case that the president is not supported by the majority of the newly elected assembly. The last two help the French constitutional system alternate from parliamentary phase to presidential phase when the majority of assembly isn’t the political alliance to which the newly elected president belongs. Due to the lack of the alliance to which the newly elected president belongs. Due to the lack of the alternating mechanism which exists in the French system, the ROC’s constitutional system fails to alternate smoothly.

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中國大陸國家權力與社會運動分析

An Analysis on the State Power and Dissident Resistance in Contemporary China

王信賢

政治學報;40期 (2006/06) P85-114

關鍵字:社會抗議, 孤島效應, 政治機會結構, 相對剝奪感, 國家一社會關係, 國家能力, island effects, political opportunity structure, relative deprivation social resistance, state-society relationship, state capacity

中文摘要

中國大陸近來各種大規模的社會抗議事件層出不窮。已引發各國與學術界高度的關注」本文透過社會心理學分析、資源動員理論以及政治機會結構等相關理論的對誌,並考量中國大陸政治體制、發展以及社會運動的現實,將上述理論整合進入當前中國「國家一社會」關係的架構中進行討論,說明收入分配高度差距以及各種貪污腐敗行為是社會弱勢群體「相對剝奪感」的最主要來源、然而,此種受剝削心態由於資源不足以及無法獲得社會菁英的奧援,使其無法形成有效的「組織性反對」,另一方面,國家透過基礎權力與專制權力的「軟硬兼施」上以及各種策略運作;包括製造「孤島效應」,「轉移民怨」策略以及操作「文革」與「蘇東」遺產等,也使得高頻率的社會運動無法形成更廣大的政治效應。但若社會失衡與貪腐行為
持績,各種抗議與騷動仍將不會間斷。

英文摘要:

Over the past two decades and a half, with the maintenance of political stability and repaid economic growth, China has become the focus of world attention. At the same time, China is faced with various problems, some of which are quite complicated and challenging. These problems include the disparity of income distribution, the corruption of government officials, and dissent resistance, as a central dynamic in understanding the critical social tensions in Chinese society. However, oppression and resistance are symbiotic political ACTS-ONE ALMOST NEVER OCCURS WITHOUT TH EOTHER. The strenuous conditions of social existence in China offer up plenty of cause foe popular protest. But the CCP is still in tight control of political process and social movement.

The proliferation of scholarship on cleavages and conflicts in relation to social movement have existed three distinct approaches which are psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, resource mobilization and political opportunity process. This article integrates the former approaches into the“ state-society”framework to analyze the dissident resistance and the responses of the Chinese government. It offers us a viewpoint to explore the strategies of CCP to prevent the turmoil from “nationalization”. Although it’s premature to evaluate the effectiveness of the new tactics, this article attempts to place the newly transformed dissent movement in political, institutional, and social context.

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取用者自治與水資源管理:比較我國嘉南地區與美國加州雷蒙集水區之地下水治理

Local Self-Governance and Water Resource Conservation; Comparing Groundwater Management in Raymond Basin of U.S.A and Chia-Nan Plain of Taiwan

湯京平、黃建勳

政治學報;40期 (2006/06) P1-39

關鍵字:市場機制、地市水、地下集水區、共享資源、使用者自治制度, common-pool resources, groundwater, groundwater basin, market mechanism, self-governance of appropriators

中文摘要

在水資源開發日益困難之際。如何有效管理有限的水資源是全球必須共同面對的重要議題。水資源的分佈往往跨越地方疆界,因此依照以往的思維,若要進行有效的管理似乎必須依賴省或中央層級的直接干預。然而這些層級的政府往往遠離基層的資源使用者,而難以制訂出具備有效誘因結構的管理機制。近年水資源管理的研究多將水視為一種共享資源(common-pool-resourcrs),鑑於這類資源的特性。有效的管理須結命國家
與市場機制,以強化使用者網絡為主體的自我管裡體系。相較於我國的中央集權管理體系。美國南加州雷蒙地下集水區的水資源管理就呈現非常多
樣而成功的風貌。足以開拓國人的政策視野。雖然台灣的灌溉水利系統一向被國際學術界譽為非當成功的經驗:但是在地下水的管理方面缺乏善可陳,近年的超抽更造成了地層下陷的嚴重後果。造成此一治理成效上差異的因素很多,固然可能因為地下水的性質不同於灌溉水所致,但更可能是中央集權的治理體系與自治體系所創造出來的誘因結構迥異,所需的管理成本也相差甚鉅。本研究把討論延伸到國外的案例,檢視其地下水使用者自治的成功經驗,並透過比較,分析自治制度構成元素與影響其運作的主要因素為何。

英文摘要:

As the spply of the flesh water become a global crisis, effective management of available water is considered as an essential and challenging task. Accumulated researchers indicate that self-governance by the resource users could be the most efficient way to manage such common-pool resources as surface and groundwater. This study compares two groundwater management systems, in Taiwan and the United States of America, to analyze why such self-governance has evolved and how such self-government system has actually worked to conserve groundwater.

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